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One of the most important industries in the United
States economy is health care, accounting for nearly
two trillion dollars in expenditure annually (Smith
et al., 2006). The United States relies on markets for
health care delivery and ﬁnancing. As a consequence,
antitrust enforcement is an important component of
health care policy. This industry is also one in which
competition is a real issue, given the extensive con-
solidation that has occurred in recent years (Gaynor
and Haas-Wilson, 1999).
During the second half of the 1990s, a dramatic
wave of hospital consolidation occurred in the United
States. One source puts the total number of hospi-
tal mergers from 1994-2000 at over 900 deals (Jakle-
vic, 2002, and www.levinassociates.com), on a base
of approximately 6,100 hospitals. Further, many lo-
cal markets, including quite a few large cities such as
Boston, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, St.
Louis, and San Francisco (and others), have come to
be dominated by 2-3 large hospital systems. Not sur-
prisingly, many health plans have complained about
rising prices as a result of these consolidations (Lesser
and Ginsburg, 2001).
Table 1 provides statistics on concentration in hos-
pital markets at 5 year intervals over the period
1985-2000.1 The table shows that the Herﬁndahl-
Hirschmann Index (HHI)2 for U.S. hospitals has been
steadily increasing over time. In particular, the me-
dian HHI increased from 3,028 in 1985 to 3,995 in
2000. This is an increase of almost 1,000 points on a
very large base. An HHI of 3,000 indicates a very con-
centrated market — for example, a market with three
1These data are for metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs)
only. This represents the vast majority of the population and
hospitals in the U.S.




i, where si is ﬁrm i’s market share, and
N is the number of ﬁrms. The HHI increases as the number
of ﬁrms decreases or asymmetry of market shares increases. It
has a maximum of 10,000 for a monopoly and has a minimum
at 10,000/N, where the market is divided equally between N
ﬁrms.
equally sized ﬁrms will have an HHI close to this value
(3,333). The FTC and DOJ consider markets with
an HHI above 1,800 as highly concentrated.3 For
highly concentrated markets such as these, the en-
forcement agencies consider any increase in the HHI
of 100 points or more as presumptively anticompeti-
tive (Federal Trade Commission and Department of
Justice, 1992). The increase in median concentration
from 1985 to 2000 is far greater than that threshold.
Hospital markets have been an active area of an-
titrust enforcement. Since 1984, the federal antitrust
authorities have brought 11 suits seeking to block
hospital mergers, and engaged in many other activi-
ties combating anticompetitive practices.4 The ma-
jor emphasis in these cases has been eﬀects on price.
A major concern in health care, however, is eﬀects on
quality.5
Quality is of major concern in health care for a
number of reasons. First, the eﬀect of health care
quality on an individual’s well-being can be very
great, and often will be more important than the
quality of other goods or services. Second, due to the
pervasive presence of insurance against health care
expenditures, health care consumers are not exposed
to the full expense associated with their health care
decisions. Thus, in the presence of a reduced role
for price, quality looms larger in consumer choice,
and serves as an important rationing device. In the
case of beneﬁciaries of the U.S. Medicare program,6
price is irrelevant for choice. Medicare pays hospi-
3Markets with an HHI below 1,000 are considered uncon-
centrated, and those with an HHI between 1,000 and 1,800 are
designated as moderately concentrated (Federal Trade Com-
mission and Department of Justice, 1992). In practice, con-
centration levels higher than the cutoﬀs in the Guidelines are
often tolerated (see Federal Trade Commission, 2004).
4See http://www.ftc.gov/ and http://www.usdoj.gov/ for
detailed information.
5Of course health care is not the only industry where eﬀects
on quality are important — it is, however, particularly salient
here.
6Mostly those over age 65, but also some disabled individu-
als, notably those with end-stage renal disease (kidney failure).
1tals and doctors ﬁxed prices for their services,7 thus
a Medicare beneﬁciary pays the same amount regard-
less of where she obtains service. Thus, for Medicare
in particular, we would expect quality to be salient.8
This is not to say that price is not important. Most
people with health insurance in the United States
have some form of managed care insurance (Gabel
et al., 2000). One of the deﬁning features of managed
care is restriction of consumer choice. Plan enrollees
are allowed to choose from a pre-approved subset of
doctors and hospitals in their area – not all doctors
or hospitals. Managed care plans thus bargain with
doctors and hospitals over prices. Hospitals or doc-
tors with prices that are too high will be excluded.
In principle, managed care plans are acting as agents
for consumers. Consumers want to reduce the price
of care, since higher prices result in higher premiums
and lower consumption of other goods.
However, quality is obviously important as well as
price. Indeed, many health care analysts have iden-
tiﬁed quality problems as a major failing of the U.S.
health care system (Kohn et al., 1999; Institute of
Medicine, 2001). Antitrust is important for health
care quality, since health care quality is determined
via markets.9 The courts and the antitrust enforce-
ment agencies have not dealt with quality in a uni-
form manner, however. In some antitrust cases, im-
pacts on quality have been explicitly considered. In
many cases, however, it has been simply presumed
that price competition will lead to beneﬁcial eﬀects
on quality.10
7Prices are regulated to be the same for a given service in a
given location at a particular point in time. Regulated prices
for a particular service vary by location and over time.
8This will also be true for in many European health sys-
tems.
9See Sage et al. (2003) for a discussion of the role of com-
petition policy in determining health care quality.
10See Hammer and Sage (2002) for a comprehensive review
of the treatment of health care quality by the courts in an-
titrust cases.
In this paper, I review the state of knowledge in
economics on issues relevant to the assessment of the
impact of competition in health care markets on qual-
ity. This is relevant for antitrust policy in the U.S.,
where there are well established health care markets,
and for the evaluation of market oriented reform pro-
posals in Europe and elsewhere. I limit myself to
the economics literature, or papers published out-
side of traditional economics journals, but nonethe-
less using an economics approach. I do not survey
the health services research literature on quality, in
particular the literature on outcomes research. That
literature is primarily concerned with measurement,
as opposed to assessing the impact of competition.
Romano (2003) provides an excellent review of this
literature.
In what follows I ﬁrst discuss performance stan-
dards for competition, then review relevant ﬁndings
from economic theory, then consider empirical evi-
dence on health care competition and quality. The
ﬁnal section of the paper contains a summary and
conclusions.
2 Performance Standards
In economics the performance standard is social wel-
fare – consumer plus producer surplus. In some cases,
however, the impacts on consumer and social welfare
diﬀer considerably. This is particularly relevant to
the topic at hand. For example, it is possible that
free entry of ﬁrms into a market can increase con-
sumer welfare, but decrease social welfare. Suppose
that entry leads to increased quality, but also that
every ﬁrm pays a ﬁxed cost of entry. Then the value
consumers derive from the higher quality may be less
than the increased costs due to entry. In this case
consumer welfare is increased but social welfare is
not. In what follows, I consider social welfare as the
performance standard, but point out situations where
considering only consumer welfare would lead to sub-
stantially diﬀerent conclusions.
While it may seem uncontroversial to point out
that there can be excessive quality in the context of
2an abstract model, it can be harder to think about
this clearly in the context of health care. Quality in
health care involves better or worse health, including
death. As a consequence, a theoretical ﬁnding that
quality is excessive can translate into a health care
setting as stating that mortality rates are too low.
Suggesting that social welfare would be improved by
increasing mortality rates is not a pleasant prospect.
However, the same economic concepts apply here
as to any other resource allocation problem. We want
to devote resources to reducing patient mortality up
until the point where the marginal beneﬁt of reduced
mortality is balanced by the marginal cost. This
means that there will be a socially optimal mortality
rate that will certainly be greater than zero. While
this may seem repugnant, it is important to realize
that there are competing uses for resources and if
the value of reduction in patient mortality is not that
great, then it may be better to devote those resources
to ﬁnding a cure for cancer, school lunches, or bat-
tleships. It is also important to realize that tradeoﬀs
involving mortality risks are made every day. We de-
vote resources to improving traﬃc and airline safety,
but not to the point that the risks of death associated
with these activities are zero.
3 What Do We Know From Economic
Theory?
Economists, antitrust scholars, and the courts intu-
itively think that competition is a good thing. In-
deed, this is the presumption of antitrust law. Eco-
nomic theory when there are diﬀerentiated products,
however, is not so clear.11 In what follows, I review
the state of knowledge on this issue from economic
theory. I divide my review into analyses where price
is regulated versus those where price is set by ﬁrms.
11By diﬀerentiated products, I mean any products that con-
sumers do not regard as identical, and thus are not perfectly
substitutable. The products may be diﬀerentiated either be-
cause some are better (e.g., Honda vs. Yugo), or because they
are somewhat diﬀerent, at least to some consumers (e.g., Coke
vs. Pepsi).
These assumptions lead to very diﬀerent results.
In particular, the impact of competition is reason-
ably clear when prices are regulated. If price is above
marginal cost, competition leads to quality and con-
sumer welfare being greater, although the impact on
social welfare is ambiguous. If ﬁrms choose both price
and quality, however, the results are much less clear.
3.1 Models
The theory of competition with diﬀerentiated prod-
ucts is complicated. My purpose here is not to review
the literature, but to try and draw out key insights.
As a consequence, I will use only simple presentations
of the theory and not dwell on details.12 Product
diﬀerentiation is represented in a number of diﬀerent
ways. In particular, economic models distinguish be-
tween vertical product diﬀerentiation, and horizon-
tal product diﬀerentiation. With vertical diﬀerenti-
ation, all consumers have the same preferences and
thus agree that some products are better than oth-
ers. I will refer to this as product quality. With hor-
izontal diﬀerentiation, consumers can have diﬀering
preferences and thus some may like one product while
others prefer another. I will call this product variety.
Since the setup of the models diﬀers, I will distin-
guish between them for clarity in reviewing results.
There are also models with both product quality and
product variety, which I discuss separately. Rather
than going into detail on the diﬀerences, I will focus
on what the models have to tell us about about the
ability of markets to deliver products with the char-
acteristics that people want (regardless of whether it
is the right “quality” or right “variety”).
In what follows I ﬁrst review the literature on prod-
uct diﬀerentiation where prices are set by ﬁrms in
the market. I begin by covering models with product
quality, then move on to those with product vari-
ety. I then cover the literature on product diﬀerenti-
ation in markets with regulated prices. Last, I review
the research that allows for both product quality and
12For more complete presentations and reviews, see Tirole
(1988); Eaton and Lipsey (1989); Anderson et al. (1992).
3product variety. Table 2 presents a summary of the
various papers and their ﬁndings.
3.2 Prices Set by Firms
There is a very broad literature on product diﬀeren-
tiation. I will review only the ﬁndings from a few key
articles. Most research has found ambiguous eﬀects
of competition (or monopoly) on welfare. In what
follows, I review the key ﬁndings for product quality
ﬁrst, then for product variety.
3.2.1 Product Quality
First consider the model of product quality by Spence
(1975). Here the question is whether a monopolist
will produce the socially optimal level of quality (only
one level of quality can be chosen). Let market in-
verse demand be p = P(q,z), where p is price, q is
quantity, and z is quality. Assume that price is de-
creasing in q and increasing in z. Let the cost func-
tion be TC = C(q,z), where costs are increasing in
quantity and quality.
First consider the choices made by a social planner,
who maximizes social welfare (the diﬀerence between





P(x,z)dx − C(q,z). (1)













Now consider the monopolist’s problem. The mo-
nopolist maximizes proﬁts,
max
q,z π = P(q,z) · q − C(q,z). (4)
The ﬁrst-order conditions to the monopolist’s
problem are:














A comparison between the ﬁrst-order conditions
(3) and (6) is illuminating. Dividing the ﬁrst terms in
both equations by q, we have the social planner con-








whereas the monopolist is concerned with the
marginal marginal valuation of quality, the marginal




The social planner considers the eﬀect of an in-
crease in quality on all consumers, whereas the mo-
nopolist considers only the eﬀect of an increase in
quality on the marginal consumer. Therefore, for a
ﬁxed quantity, the monopolist will provide too little,











The monopolist will supply the socially optimal
quality only when the marginal consumer is the av-
erage consumer. When the marginal consumer’s val-
uation is less than the average the monopolist will
supply too little quality, and vice versa. Since it
seems quite likely there is considerable heterogene-
ity in consumer preferences for health care quality, it
seems particularly unlikely that the expression above
is an equality.
The consequence is that there is no general theoret-
ical prediction on whether monopoly reduces welfare
4when product diﬀerentiation takes the form of ver-
tical quality diﬀerences. The exception to this con-
clusion occurs if the monopolist can perfectly price
discriminate. Under this condition the monopolist
will maximize social welfare. Since the monopolist
captures all of consumer surplus when they perfectly
price discriminate their problem is the same as the so-
cial planner’s problem in (1). Although this will lead
to the socially eﬃcient outcome, there is redistribu-
tion away from consumers, since the discriminating
monopolist captures all of the surplus.
It is possible to construct less general models that
generate the conclusion that monopoly undersupplies
or oversupplies quality.13 Consider the following ex-
ample from Pepall et al. (2005).
Let consumers have the following inverse demand
function, p = z(θ−q). The term θz is the reservation
price, so consumers’ reservation price is increasing in
quality. Let the costs of production be constant and
zero, but the costs of quality be described by c = αz2.
Then the ﬁrst-order proﬁt maximization conditions
for the monopolist are:
∂π
∂q
= z(θ − 2q) = 0 (7)
∂π
∂z
= (θq − q) − 2αz = 0. (8)
We can solve for the monopolist’s proﬁt maximiz-





The monopolist clearly does not choose the quan-
tity and quality that maximize social welfare. Since
the marginal cost of quantity is zero, the social wel-
fare maximizing quantity is θ. That is the quantity at
which the demand curve crosses the horizontal axis.
We can ﬁnd the social welfare maximizing quality
as follows. Social welfare is maximized where the
change in consumer surplus from additional quality
equals the marginal cost of quality,
13See Tirole (1988), Section 2.2.1 and Pepall et al. (2005),
Section 7.5.1, for examples.
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which means that the monopolist undersupplies qual-
ity.
Mussa and Rosen (1978) is an important paper
with a diﬀerent setup than Spence. In their paper,
Mussa and Rosen consider a monopolist that sells the
same good at diﬀerent levels of quality to discrim-
inate among consumers with diﬀerent valuations.14
The monopolist cannot perfectly price discriminate
— it does not know individuals’ valuations. The mo-
nopolist does know, however, the distribution of val-
uations in the population. As a consequence, the
monopolist can set quality levels to get consumers to
self-select their most preferred quality, thus allowing
the monopolist to price discriminate. This leads to a
distortion, thus monopoly leads to ineﬃcient quality
choice.
Consider a simple example with two types of con-
sumers. Let type 1s value quality more than type 2s.
The monopolist can maximize proﬁts by setting two
levels of quality in such a way that the type 1s select
the high quality good and the type 2s select the low
quality good.
In order to do this, the diﬀerence in quality be-
tween the high and low quality products has to be
large enough that the type 1s will not choose the low
quality good. The self-selection then allows the mo-
nopolist to set the prices of the high and low quality
14In Spence’s model only one level of quality can be cho-
sen. This drives the diﬀerence between Spence and Mussa and
Rosen.
5good to extract the maximum amount of surplus from
consumers.
This, however, leads to a distortion. In order to
get the type 1s to choose the high quality/high price
product, the monopolist sets the quality on the low
quality product low enough that it is not a good sub-
stitute to the type 1s. Thus quality choice is dis-
torted.
As in all models of this type, the ineﬃciency results
from an information asymmetry. If the monopolist
knew consumers’ valuations, then it could perfectly
price discriminate. This would be socially eﬃcient,
although not desirable from consumers’ perspectives.
Some further insight into the determinants of qual-
ity levels can be gained from the model of Dorfman
and Steiner (1954). Their model is nominally about
choice of price and advertising, but can also be in-
terpreted as about price and quality (although in a
somewhat restrictive way).15 Consider a ﬁrm who
has the following proﬁt function, where per unit (and
marginal) costs are constant in quantity (q) and in-
creasing in quality (z), and F represents ﬁxed costs,16
π = q(p,z) · (p − c − d · z) − F. (10)




= q + p ·
∂q
∂p






− d · q = 0. (12)
Let the price and quality elasticities of demand be
15Dorfman and Steiner model a monopolist’s behavior. We
can consider this an approximation to the behavior of a mo-
nopolistically competitive ﬁrm if we think of the demand func-
tion as a reduced form demand, e.g., an oligopolist’s residual
demand curve (see, e.g., Dranove and Satterthwaite, 2000).














Then the ﬁrst-order condition for price can be ex-
pressed in the following familiar form (remembering
that marginal cost = c + d · z),
p =




or as the Lerner Index,
L =






After some manipulation we can obtain the follow-
















This says that the amount spent on quality rela-
tive to sales should go up if the quality elasticity of
demand increases or the price elasticity of demand
declines, and vice versa. It also oﬀers some other
insights.
Presume that there exist “optimal” values of the
price and quality elasticities, that is, there exist
unique values which induce the monopolist to choose
the socially optimal price and quality. Then if market
power over price increases, i.e., εp goes down, price
will increase above the optimum. Quality will also in-
crease, but to a supra-optimal level.17 Alternatively,
17The excess proﬁts may attract entry, but that entry is not
6if the quality elasticity decreases, quality will fall to a
sub-optimal level, even if the price elasticity is at its
optimal value. If an increase in market power reduces
both the price and quality elasticities, the eﬀect on
quality is unclear. Price will certainly rise. If the
price and quality elasticities fall by the same propor-
tion, so that their ratio is unchanged, price will still
rise and as a consequence quality will also rise above
its optimal level. If the ratio of the quality elastic-
ity to the price elasticity falls by more than price
increases, quality will fall below the optimal level.
There are some other papers which provide a simi-
lar intuition, although the models are quite diﬀerent
from Dorfman and Steiner. Dranove and Satterth-
waite (1992) consider the eﬀects of information on
price and quality when consumers are imperfectly in-
formed about both. They ﬁnd that if consumers have
better information about price than about quality,
then this can lead to an equilibrium with suboptimal
quality. Intuitively this is similar to an increase in
the price elasticity of demand, with no increase in
the quality elasticity.
Kranton (2003) examines the impact of competi-
tion on quality when consumers have imperfect in-
formation about quality. A number of papers have
considered the question of whether there is an equi-
librium at which the socially optimal quality is pro-
duced in a market where consumers are imperfectly
informed about quality (but not about price) (Allen,
1984; Klein and Leﬄer, 1981; Shapiro, 1983). These
papers demonstrate that there is an equilibrium with
optimal quality if consumers can learn about quality
ex post and if ﬁrms care enough about (future) re-
peat business. In this equilibrium there is a “quality-
assuring price” that is above marginal cost and sup-
ports the optimal quality. Kranton shows that this
result does not necessarily hold if ﬁrms compete in
price for market share (a feature that is absent from
the prior models). If a ﬁrm can increase (and sustain)
its market share by cutting price, then there isn’t
an equilibrium at the socially optimal quality level.
necessarily welfare increasing. Each entrant adds F to costs,
but does not necessarily increase surplus accordingly. See the
next section for an explicit discussion of this issue.
One may apply the intuition from the Dorfman and
Steiner model to Kranton’s result. The ability to in-
crease market share via price cuts is analogous to the
price elasticity of demand exceeding the quality elas-
ticity, hence both price and quality are lower. If the
reference point is an equilibrium with optimal qual-
ity, as in Kranton’s model, then the lower quality is
suboptimal.
Allard et al. (2005) explicitly consider competition
in the physician services market. They consider a re-
peated game between physicians and patients. The
patient’s health is determined by observable medical
care and physician eﬀort. Physician eﬀort is any-
thing physicians do that aﬀects patient health. It
can be thought of as quality. The patient observes his
health ex post, so physician eﬀort is observable, but is
non-contractible. In the static game physicians will
supply sub-optimal eﬀort. However, in the repeated
game there is an equilibrium in which physicians sup-
ply optimal eﬀort. This equilibrium obtains under
certain conditions, in particular, if patient switching
costs are not too high and there is an excess supply of
physicians. If switching costs are high then eﬀort will
be suboptimal, but competition will result in eﬀort
levels above the minimum.18 Again, there are par-
allels to the Dorfman and Steiner intuition. In the
Allard et al. model optimal eﬀort occurs when pa-
tient switching costs are not too high. This is similar
to the quality elasticity of demand being suﬃciently
high in the Dorfman and Steiner model. Sub-optimal
eﬀort occurs when switching costs are high, analogous
to a low quality elasticity of demand.
While there are still no determinate conclusions
from this framework, it does oﬀer some useful guid-
ance for thinking about issues of competition in
health care markets. For example, the advent of man-
aged care in the 1990s is commonly thought to have
increased the price elasticity of demand facing health
care ﬁrms (hospitals in particular). This should have
18In addition, if there is uncertainty in the relationship be-
tween patient health and physician actions, then physicians
face some risk of patients switching even if they have supplied
optimal eﬀort. In this case there physicians will supply supra-
optimal eﬀort.
7led to decreased prices, and indeed seems to have
done so.19 If there was no suﬃciently countervail-
ing increase in the quality elasticity, then quality
should have fallen. It is important to bear in mind
here that if the starting point was one where hospi-
tals possessed market power, then the model predicts
that quality should have been at supra-optimal levels.
Thus a decrease in quality could be welfare improving
(assuming it did not fall below the optimal level).
Another change in health care markets is the re-
cent emphasis on medical errors and quality improve-
ment. If that leads to the quality elasticity of de-
mand increasing, then quality will increase. If the
price elasticity remains unchanged this will increase
price (since increased quality raises marginal cost),
but price cost margins will remain unchanged. This
framework will prove helpful in making sense of some
results from the empirical literature, as we shall see
later in this paper.
3.2.2 Product Variety
In the previous section I reviewed the ﬁndings of eco-
nomic theory on quality and competition for models
of vertical product quality. I now turn to product
variety. The classic references on this are Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) and Spence (1976).
To illustrate, consider a simple model based on
Spence (1976) and Mankiw and Whinston (1986).








where ﬁrm i produces output qi and both of the func-
tions G and f are concave. This gives consumers a
taste for product variety and also implies that the
various ﬁrms’ products are substitutes.
Costs consist of a ﬁxed cost of entry, F, and vari-
able cost, c(q).
19See Dranove and Satterthwaite (2000) and Gaynor and
Vogt (2000) for reviews of the evidence.
Impose symmetry for simplicity and let the social




W(N) = G(N · f(qN))−N·c(qN)−N·F . (20)
With N ﬁrms the symmetric ﬁrm output is qN.
Now consider proﬁt maximizing behavior by ﬁrms.
First note that with N ﬁrms, utility maximization
by consumers implies that the equilibrium price is
G0 (N · f(qN))f0(qN). Each ﬁrm’s equilibrium prof-
its are therefore,
πN = G0 (N · f(qN))f0(qN) · qN − c(qN) − F. (21)
Now consider the ﬁrst-order condition for the social
planner,
W0 = G0 [Nf0q0
N] − c(qN) − Nc0(qN)q0
N − F. (22)
We obtain the following expression by adding and
subtracting the term G0f0q0
N and rearranging,
W0 = πN + N [G0f0 − c0]q0
N + G0 [f − f0qN]. (23)
First, assume that the third term in the expression
above is zero. Now consider the second term. G0f0−c0
is price minus marginal cost. It is non-negative. The
term q0
N is how per ﬁrm output changes with the
number of ﬁrms. Assume it is negative, i.e. there is
a business stealing eﬀect of ﬁrm entry. Then, for any
markup of price over marginal cost, the second term
is negative. Thus W0 < πN. This implies that πN at
the socially optimal N is positive. At a competitive
(free entry) equilibrium, proﬁts must equal zero. It
is true that proﬁts fall with the number of ﬁrms (see
Mankiw and Whinston). This then implies that the
number of ﬁrms in competitive equilibrium is greater
than the socially optimal number, i.e. competition
8produces too much product diversity. This happens
because ﬁrms do not take the business stealing eﬀect
into account. The gain in social welfare from entry
is outweighed by the ﬁxed costs incurred. The con-
clusion is diﬀerent, however, when measured against
a consumer welfare performance standard. Ignoring
the ﬁxed costs incurred by entering ﬁrms, since they
don’t aﬀect consumer welfare, implies that consumers
are made (weakly) better oﬀ by entry.20
Now assume that the second term in (23) is zero
and consider only the third term. G0 [f − f0qN] rep-
resents the eﬀect of product diversity (due to more
ﬁrms). This term is positive, since f is concave. Con-
sumers value product diversity, but an entering ﬁrm
cannot capture all of the increase in surplus they gen-
erate. G0f is the contribution to surplus of another
ﬁrm, and G0f0qN is the ﬁrm’s revenue. Using the ar-
gument from the preceding paragraph, the fact that
this term is positive implies that a free entry equilib-
rium will produce too little product diversity, due to
the non-appropriability of social surplus.
It isn’t possible in general to tell whether one
of these terms is larger than the other. The
business stealing eﬀect could dominate the non-
appropriability eﬀect, or vice versa, or they could be
exactly balanced. Therefore a free entry monopolisti-
cally competitive equilibrium can result in too much
product diversity, too little, or precisely the optimal
amount.
3.3 Regulated Prices
In contrast to the mostly ambiguous theoretical re-
sults on competition and quality with variable prices,
the theoretical literature on competition and quality
when prices are regulated is clear. When price is
above marginal cost, competition leads to more qual-
ity. This improves consumer welfare, but can have
any impact on social welfare. In particular, there
is a distinct possibility that competition will lead
20If there is 100% business stealing then consumer welfare is
unaﬀected. If there is less than 100% business stealing, then
consumers are made better oﬀ.
to excessive quality provision from the perspective
of social welfare. In this section the focus is solely
on product quality, since it is well known that ﬁrms
will pursue minimal product variety in the absence of
price competition (e.g., Hotelling, 1929; White, 1972;
Tirole, 1988, section 7.1.3). In what follows, I review
the general economics literature on this topic and also
that from health economics.
Government regulation commonly leads to ﬁxed
prices. The most prominent example of this in U.S.
health care is the Medicare program. Price regula-
tion in health care is the norm in most other coun-
tries. Medicare sets ﬁxed prices for hospitals based
on a patient’s diagnosis.21 Doctors are paid ﬁxed
prices for services provided. Further, Medicare bene-
ﬁts are such that Medicare beneﬁciaries pay the same
amount regardless of the provider they use to obtain
care. As a consequence, economic models of compe-
tition with regulated prices are relevant here.
These models largely derive from analyses of in-
dustries subject to price regulation up until the 1970s
and 1980s, e.g., airlines and taxis.22 There are also
some models speciﬁc to health care.23 The intu-
ition of these models is as follows. Price is regulated,
so ﬁrms compete for consumers on non-price dimen-
sions, i.e. “quality.” If the regulated price is set
above marginal cost at some baseline level of quality,
then ﬁrms will increase quality to try to gain market
share. This will continue until proﬁts are zero. Since
ﬁrms don’t take account of stealing market share, in
equilibrium quality levels can be excessive.
Consider the following sketch of a simple model.
Let quality have only a vertical dimension, i.e., “more
is better.” For simplicity in exposition, assume that
21Prices are ﬁxed for a given location and point in time.
Thus Medicare regulated prices vary geographically and in-
tertemporally. This applies to both doctors and hospitals.
22See, for example, Douglas and Miller (1974); Schmalensee
(1977); Vander Weide and Zalkind (1981); White (1972) on
airlines and Frankena and Pautler (1984) on taxicabs.
23Allen and Gertler (1991); Held and Pauly (1983); Pope
(1989).
9the demand that any ﬁrm i faces is separable in its
market share, si, and the level of market demand, D.
Firm i thus faces a demand of:
qi = si(zi,z−i)D(p,zi,z−i) (24)
where si is ﬁrm i’s market share, zi is ﬁrm i’s quality,
z−i is a vector of all other ﬁrms’ qualities, D is mar-
ket demand, and p is the regulated price.24 Assume
that i’s market share is increasing in own quality,
decreasing in the number of ﬁrms, and that the re-
sponsiveness of market share to own quality is also
increasing in the number of ﬁrms.
Assume that ﬁrms all use the same technology and
face the same input prices. Then they each have costs
described by:
ci = c(qi,zi) − F (25)
where c(·) is variable cost, and F is a ﬁxed cost of
entry.
Further assume that there is free entry and exit, so
that all ﬁrms earn zero proﬁts in equilibrium. Then,
assuming Nash behavior, equilibrium is described by



















πi = p · qi − ci = 0 (27)
Inspection of (26) yields some immediate insights.
First compare equilibrium quality under monopoly
24Note that for consumers insulated from the cost of con-
sumption, as in health care, the price they face will be less
than the price received by the ﬁrm. I ignore this in order to
keep this sketch of a model simple. It would not aﬀect the
conclusions in any event.
to that with multiple ﬁrms. Notice that, since a mo-
nopolist faces market demand, the ﬁrst term in curly
brackets in (26) vanishes and si = 1. Since ∂si
∂zi is
positive (by assumption), the term in curly brackets
is larger with multiple ﬁrms than with a monopo-
list, so equilibrium quality is higher with competi-
tion. Whether welfare is higher depends on the rel-
ative magnitudes of ∂si
∂zi and ∂D
∂zi. In particular, if
∂D
∂zi equals zero, then increases in quality do not shift
market demand, and quality competition is simply
over market share, and hence wasteful.
Since ∂si
∂zi increases with the number of ﬁrms (i.e.,
the ﬁrm’s demand becomes more elastic with respect
to own quality the more alternatives there are for
consumers), quality competition will be more intense
with entry and equilibrium quality will increase with
the number of ﬁrms in the market. This beneﬁts
consumers, but may not increase social welfare. In
particular, the increase in consumer surplus from in-
creased quality may be outweighed by the increased
costs, particularly if there is diminishing marginal
utility from quality and diminishing returns in quality
production. As indicated previously, this may result
in excessive quality levels.
The positive predictions of this model are clear.
Quality is increasing in the number of ﬁrms in the
market, i.e., competition leads to more quality. Fur-
ther, quality is increasing in the regulated price. One
may write down a ﬁrm’s equilibrium quality function
as the (implicit) solution to equations (26) and (27),
ze = z(p,cq,cz,si,D) (28)
where cq and cz denote ﬁrst derivatives. The ﬁrm’s
level of quality depends on the level of the regulated
price, the marginal cost of quantity, the marginal cost
of quality, the level of demand, market share, and the
quality elasticities of market share and market de-
mand. This can be seen informally by manipulating









z are the quality elasticities of mar-
ket share and market demand, respectively. Quality
is increasing in price, the elasticity of demand with
respect to quality, and the ﬁrm’s total demand. Qual-
ity is decreasing in the marginal costs of quantity or
quality.
This has implications for econometric speciﬁca-
tions for empirical analysis. The equation to be esti-
mated is (28). However, measures of marginal cost,
market share, and demand are likely to be endoge-
nous in an econometric equation. One would employ
exogenous determinants of these factors, such as cost
shifters (W), demand shifters (XD), and the number
of ﬁrms (N). A reduced form econometric speciﬁca-
tion would thus look something like the following,
ze = Z(p,W,XD,N,ε) (30)
where ε is a random error term.
As we shall see, most of the empirical studies to
date include a measure of market structure and a
number of control variables. They are not generally
clear about whether the control variables represent
cost shifters or demand shifters. Further, the reg-
ulated price, p, is generally omitted from empirical
studies, although theory indicates its inclusion.
The normative implications of the model are less
clear than the positive ones. Depending on the na-
ture of demand (speciﬁcally how responsive market
demand is to quality), competition may lead to ex-
cessive quality provision. Similarly, a higher regu-
lated price may reduce welfare by leading to exces-
sive quality. These conclusions, however, are altered
if we consider only consumer welfare. Consumers are
never made worse oﬀ by competition. If competition
leads only to demand stealing they are no better oﬀ
as a result, but if it leads to any increase in market
demand then consumers are unequivocally better oﬀ.
The model outlined above is not speciﬁc to health
care. In particular, the majority of ﬁrms in the hos-
pital industry are not-for-proﬁt. Let us now write
down a simple model that captures this aspect of the
health care industry. There have been many mod-
els of not-for-proﬁt hospitals (Pauly and Redisch,
1973; Newhouse, 1970; Lee, 1971; Lakdawalla and
Philipson, 1998). While there is no agreement on a
general model, most models posit an objective func-
tion which includes proﬁts and some other argument,
such as quantity or quality. Therefore, let us assume
that not-for-proﬁt hospitals have an objective func-
tion which includes quality and proﬁts (as a short-
hand for everything else they care about). Further,
for simplicity, let this function be additively separa-
ble in quality and proﬁts and linear in proﬁts:
Ui = u(zi,πi) = v(zi) + πi. (31)
We can now revisit the ﬁrst-order conditions for






















Notice that the only diﬀerence with the ﬁrst-order
conditions for an industry of proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms
is the presence of the last term, ∂v
∂zi. Since this term
is positive, the value that not-for-proﬁt ﬁrms put on
quality acts like a reduction in the marginal cost of
producing quality, i.e., not-for-proﬁt ﬁrms will act
like for-proﬁt ﬁrms with a lower marginal cost of
quality.25 This implies that quality will be higher
in equilibrium. The comparative statics, however,
are identical with an industry of proﬁt maximizing
ﬁrms. Quality is increasing in the number of ﬁrms
and the regulated price, as before.
25This is the same speciﬁcation and result as for not-for-
proﬁt ﬁrms that care about quantity, as opposed to quality.
See Lakdawalla and Philipson (1998); Gaynor and Vogt (2003).
113.4 Models with both Product Quality and
Variety
There are some models with both product quality
and variety. Product variety in these models is usu-
ally chosen ﬁrst, and is typically location along a
line. Product quality then consists of choice of a level
of a common characteristic. These are sequential
games, with strategic variables determined in order.
The sequential nature of these games is necessary for
tractability, but also leads to diﬀerent outcomes than
if the strategic variables are chosen simultaneously.
Both price setting and regulated price situations are
considered.
Kamien and Vincent (1991) and Ma and Burgess
(1993) are two similar papers. The models are of
duopolies with ﬁxed locations where ﬁrms go on to
sequentially choose quality and price. Variety is de-
termined ﬁrst (exogenously), then ﬁrms either choose
quality and price simultaneously or then quality and
last price. These papers both give the result that
unregulated competition leads to suboptimal quality
when price is chosen after quality. Fierce competition
in the anticipated subgame in prices that follows the
quality choice subgame leads ﬁrms to choose lower
quality, since the tough price competition lowers the
return to quality. This turns out to be suboptimal,
thus price regulation can thus improve on competi-
tion.
Kamien and Vincent (1991) show that with unreg-
ulated competition there is a symmetric equilibrium
in which quality is too low, due to the ﬁerce price
competition that ensues. They also show that price
regulation can lead to the optimal quality level if the
price is set just right. If not, quality can be too high
or too low.
Ma and Burgess (1993) also consider a model where
ﬁrms have ﬁxed locations. Firms then choose quality
and price sequentially. If there is a ﬁxed cost of qual-
ity then ﬁrms react to quality disadvantages by price
reductions. This price response reduces the return
to higher quality. As a consequence, ﬁrms have an
incentive to provide less quality and thus provide a
suboptimal level of quality to avoid generating tough
price competition. They ﬁnd that price regulation
can improve welfare by eliminating the quality dis-
tortion induced by price competition.
These results derive from a number of speciﬁc as-
sumptions of the model. Ma and Burgess show that
if ﬁrms compete simultaneously in quality and prices,
instead of sequentially, equilibrium qualities are op-
timal. If there are only marginal costs of quality and
no ﬁxed costs, then the equilibrium quality is opti-
mal. The assumption of linear demand eliminates the
Spence eﬀect (diﬀerence between average and mar-
ginal valuation). Nevertheless, Ma and Burgess show
that there are conditions under which competition
leads to suboptimal quality.
A paper by Lyon (1999) adapts this kind of model
to the institutional speciﬁcs of health care markets.
Speciﬁcally, Lyon examines a model of health care
competition which includes insurers and hospitals.
The insurance market is presumed competitive. Hos-
pitals are diﬀerentiated both with regard to product
variety and quality. Product variety is captured as
location and product quality is the quality of care.
Product variety is ﬁxed (the hospitals are at the ends
of a unit line). Lyon assumes the entire market is cov-
ered, so competition is only over market share. He
considers two kinds of insurance: “traditional” insur-
ance in which consumers have free choice of hospitals,
and managed care, in which choice is restricted.
Lyon shows for traditional insurance that hospitals
will increase prices to the point where the last con-
sumer is just indiﬀerent about purchasing insurance.
Since all consumers are insured, only a fraction of any
one hospital’s price increase is passed on to consumers
through the insurance premium. This softens price
competition, and thus hospitals compete on quality.
Since the competition is only over market share, in
equilibrium quality levels are excessive and prices are
supra-optimal.
The results for managed care are quite diﬀerent.
Under managed care, there are exclusive contracts
between hospitals and insurers, thus the choice of an
insurer is the same as choice of a hospital. In this
case, a price increase by a hospital is fully passed on
through the insurance premium. This makes price
12competition tougher than in the traditional insurance
case, and thus prices are lower. Quality is therefore
lower than in the traditional insurance case. Qual-
ity can be is lower or higher than the social opti-
mum, depending on whether it is suﬃciently costly.
Nonetheless, consumers are always better oﬀ with
managed care than with traditional insurance. Man-
aged care provides lower quality, but also lower prices,
and lower prices are low enough to more than com-
pensate for the lower quality.
Nuscheler (2003) studies competition with regu-
lated prices. He models competition as a three stage
game. In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms enter, in the second
stage they choose location (on a circle), and in the
third stage they choose quality. Quality is increas-
ing in the regulated price. Entry is decreasing in
the regulated price, since potential entrants antici-
pate ﬁercer quality competition at a higher price.
Not too surprisingly, (ﬁrst-best) optimality cannot
be achieved when price is the only instrument avail-
able to the regulator. The regulator would like to
achieve optimal entry and quality (location is sym-
metric in equilibrium, so that is determined by en-
try), but that will not generally be feasible with only
one policy instrument. If the regulator sets the price
at the level that induces optimal quality, there is ex-
cessive entry. If the regulator sets the price at the
level that leads to optimal entry, then there is exces-
sive quality. This could be solved either by a nonlin-
ear price, or by regulating entry as well as price.
Barring those possibilities, if the regulator can
commit to a ﬁxed price at the very beginning of the
game (with no re-optimization in subsequent stages),
then there is a second-best regulated price. Equi-
librium entry and quality at this price will both ex-
ceed the optimal (ﬁrst-best) levels. Nuscheler shows,
however, that this second-best price is not credible.
The regulator’s optimal price changes after the sec-
ond stage of the game (location, following entry in
stage 1). This is therefore the only credible price by
the regulator. This price leads to the ﬁrst-best qual-
ity, but induces excessive entry.
The results from these papers reinforce the ﬁnd-
ings reviewed in the preceding sections that compe-
tition need not lead to optimal quality. The papers
by Kamien and Vincent and Ma and Burgess pre-
dict that when prices are set by ﬁrms, competition
will lead to decreased, and suboptimal, quality. Lyon
also models competition with prices set by ﬁrms, but
obtains diﬀerent results from Kamien and Vincent
and Ma and Burgess, due to the presence of health
insurance in his model. Lyon’s results depend on the
nature of the health insurance regime. If consumers
have insurance contracts that allow them choices over
hospitals, then competition leads to increased, and
excessive quality. If consumers have contracts that
restrict their choice of hospital, then competition can
lead to too little or too much quality. Nuscheler
shows that quality is increasing in the regulated price.
The regulator may set the price to achieve optimal
quality, but cannot also achieve the optimal market
structure.
4 What Do We Know From Econo-
metric Studies?
There is a rapidly growing empirical literature on
competition and quality in health care. At present
the evidence from this literature is entirely on hospi-
tal markets. In what follows I will review this litera-
ture, focusing mainly on the economics literature.26 I
will ﬁrst review the results from econometric studies
of markets with regulated prices, and then variable
prices, reversing the ordering of the preceding theory
section. I do this because the theoretical predictions
for markets with regulated prices are clearer, thus
they oﬀer a clearer target for econometric hypothesis
testing.
The studies reviewed here employ a variety of
econometric approaches. The modal approach is
what I will call a “Structure-Conduct-Performance”
(SCP) speciﬁcation. These econometric models are
26Not too surprisingly, this captures the vast majority of
such studies, given the nature of the topic. While I believe I
have captured most of the prominent work on this topic, I do
not claim to have covered every study, however, in particular
any that may have appeared in the medical literature.
13derived from a conceptual model that hypothesizes
a causal link from market structure to ﬁrm conduct
and then to industry performance.27 Most SCP mod-
els applied to health care focus on the link between
market structure and ﬁrm conduct, and omit indus-
try performance. The typical conduct measure in the
general industrial organization literature is price or
price-cost margin. The typical measure of market
structure is the Herﬁndahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI),
which is the sum of the squares of all ﬁrms’ market
shares.28 The equation usually estimated has roughly
the following appearance,
p = β0 + β1q + β2XD + β3W + β4HHI + ε (33)
where XD represents demand shifters and W cap-
tures cost shifters. The SCP studies of quality simply
employ a measure of quality as the dependent vari-
able in this equation, rather than price. Only one of
the studies I review estimated equations for price and
quality together.
The SCP approach has a number of well recog-
nized problems when price is the dependent variable
(see Bresnahan, 1989; Schmalensee, 1989, on these is-
sues). These problems also apply when quality is the
dependent variable, and there are some additional is-
sues. First, the use of the HHI in a pricing equation
can be explicitly derived only from a homogeneous
goods Cournot model of conduct.29 Obviously an
SCP regression with quality as the dependent vari-
able does not derive from this framework. In the case
of regulated price, theory does point to an economet-
ric model with a measure of market structure on the
right hand side (see equation (30)). Even in this case,
or even if one thinks of a quality SCP regression as de-
riving from a broad conceptual framework as opposed




i, where si is ﬁrm i’s market share, and
there are N ﬁrms in the market.
29In that case, the coeﬃcient on the HHI in an SCP regres-
sion captures the elasticity of demand, not ﬁrm conduct (which
is already assumed to be Cournot).
to a speciﬁc theoretical model, a number of issues re-
main. The HHI (or any market structure measure) is
usually regarded as endogenous. Unmeasured varia-
tion in demand and cost factors aﬀect both quality
and market structure. For example, a ﬁrm with low
costs is likely to have both a high market share (lead-
ing to a high HHI) and choose high quality (refer to
equation (18) for optimal quality in the Dorfman and
Steiner type framework or equation (29) for optimal
quality for a regulated price regime).
Two additional speciﬁcation issues arises in re-
gard to SCP studies of markets with regulated prices.
When ﬁrms set prices it is clear that price and qual-
ity are determined simultaneously, so an SCP model
might either include price and treat it as endoge-
nous, or simply include exogenous determinants of
price. Typically price is not included in the stud-
ies reviewed here, although it is not clear whether
the authors were explicitly trying to include exoge-
nous determinants of price. When price is regulated,
however, price (or the price cost margin) should ap-
pear as an exogenous determinant of quality (again,
see equation (30)). In some studies price is omitted
based on the argument that, since price is regulated,
price does not aﬀect demand (e.g., for Medicare ben-
eﬁciaries). The regulated price should be included,
however, because it is a determinant of supply, not
demand.
There is another complication due to the nature of
hospitals. The major purchasers of hospital services
are Medicare and private health insurers. Medicare
sets regulated prices. Prices from private health in-
surers are determined in the market. Since hospitals
generally sell in both markets, one must either ac-
count for this or presume that there are no comple-
mentarities between the two (e.g., demand and cost
are completely separable in Medicare and private out-
put). Many of the studies that focus on Medicare
seemingly make the implicit assumption of separabil-
ity.
While the majority of the studies I review here em-
ploy an SCP framework, some employ diﬀerent ap-
proaches. Some studies evaluate the impact of merg-
ers, some evaluate the impact of regulatory changes
14(e.g, price deregulation), two studies estimate de-
mand, one study examines the determinants of the
number of ﬁrms, and a number estimate the rela-
tionship between hospital volume of a surgical pro-
cedure and patient health outcomes. Each of these
approaches have their advantages and disadvantages.
I will discuss these in the context of evaluating the
various studies.
Before proceeding, however, I want to note that
the results of the majority of these studies provide
evidence only on positive questions, e.g., “Does com-
petition increase quality?”. Few of these studies al-
low for normative analysis. This ﬁrst wave of studies
consists for the most part of policy evaluation and
reduced form studies.30 It is not possible to evaluate
eﬀects on welfare with these kinds of studies. This
should not be taken as a criticism of these studies,
but simply a recognition of what sorts of inferences
can be drawn from them.
4.1 Studies with Regulated Prices
There are a number of studies of hospital quality pro-
vided to Medicare patients. The amount a Medicare
beneﬁciary pays is the same, regardless of where she
obtains care (again, in a given area at a given point
in time). As a consequence, price is not a strategic
variable for hospitals serving Medicare patients. Ta-
ble 3 presents a summary of these studies and their
ﬁndings. The entry in the column labelled “Eﬀect
of Competition on Quality” indicates the direction
of the relationship between the competition measure
and the quality measure. For example, in the ﬁrst
row, the entry “Increase” in that column indicates
that the quality is higher in more competitive mar-
kets. For the study cited in the ﬁrst row (Kessler
and McClellan, 2000), quality is measured by mortal-
ity and competition is measured by the HHI. Quality
is inversely related to mortality – lower mortality is
30By policy evaluation studies, I mean econometric speciﬁ-
cations that evaluate the impact of some policy or (economic)
environmental factor, but are not derived from an explicit eco-
nomic model. By reduced form, I mean an econometric speci-
ﬁcation that is the reduced form of a speciﬁc economic model.
higher quality. Competition is inversely related to the
HHI – the HHI is lower in more competitive markets.
So, the ﬁnding that competition increases quality is
based on a positive empirical relationship between
mortality and the HHI – mortality is higher in less
competitive markets.
Kessler and McClellan (2000) is a study of the
impact of hospital market concentration on risk-
adjusted one year mortality from acute myocardial
infarction (AMI, i.e., a heart attack) for Medicare
patients. Expenditures on these patients are also
studied. The study included data on all non-rural
Medicare beneﬁciaries with AMI during selected
years from 1985 to 1994. Kessler and McClellan use
the SCP framework discussed above, with some mod-
iﬁcations. They instrument for the HHI with hospi-
tal market shares predicted from a model of patient
choice of hospital, where patient choice is largely de-
termined by distance from the hospital. They also
employ zip code ﬁxed eﬀects. As a consequence, the
eﬀects of hospital market concentration are identiﬁed
by changes in the predicted HHI. The speciﬁcation
they employ, however, omits the regulated Medicare
price. A number of hospital and area characteristics
are included, HMO enrollment among them. It is
unclear whether they are considered demand or cost
shifters.
The results from this study are striking. Kessler
and McClellan ﬁnd that risk-adjusted one year mor-
tality for Medicare AMI patients is signiﬁcantly
higher in more concentrated markets. In particular,
patients in the most concentrated markets had mor-
tality probabilities 1.46 points higher than those in
the least concentrated markets (this constitutes a 4.4
percent diﬀerence) as of 1991. This is an extremely
large diﬀerence – it amounts to over 2,000 fewer (sta-
tistical) deaths in the least concentrated vs. most
concentrated markets. The results with regard to ex-
penditures have a somewhat diﬀerent pattern. Prior
to 1991, expenditures were higher in less concentrated
markets, while the reverse is true as of 1991.
Kessler and McClellan also ﬁnd that HMO enroll-
ment reduced expenditures on average, but had no
statistically detectable impact on mortality. They
15also ﬁnd an interaction eﬀect between HMO enroll-
ment and market concentration. In low HMO en-
rollment states, patients in less concentrated markets
had higher expenditures and better (although statis-
tically insigniﬁcant) outcomes. In states with high
HMO enrollment, patients in less concentrated mar-
kets had lower expenditures and lower mortality.
The positive inferences from this study are clear.
Mortality from heart attacks for Medicare patients
is lower in less concentrated markets. The eﬀects
of concentration are stronger beginning in 1991 and
are reinforced by HMO enrollment. The omission of
the regulated price is unfortunate, although for this
omission to lead to biased estimates the changes in
the omitted price would have to be correlated with
the within zip code changes in the predicted HHI. It
is unclear whether the inclusion of market and hos-
pital characteristics is intended to control for possi-
ble hospital complementarities between Medicare and
private output. So long as it is unlikely there are im-
portant omitted factors there should be no problem
with bias. While it is clear that concentration aﬀects
hospital quality, the mechanism by which this works
is not.
It seems unlikely that hospitals deliberately choose
lower quality in the form of an increased probability
of death. What may be happening is that hospi-
tals in more concentrated markets take some of their
excess proﬁts in slack. General slack in the hospi-
tal may have the unintended consequence of higher
mortality. Another issue with regard to this appli-
cation is whether hospitals compete for heart attack
patients. Tay (2003) states that one-half of heart at-
tack patients arrive at the hospital via ambulance.
It seems unlikely that these patients have any choice
of hospital, hence hospitals cannot compete for these
patients. I think the most likely story is that heart
attack patients are the “canary in the mine shaft.”
Hospitals in more competitive environments are pres-
sured to be better across the board, and that man-
ifests itself clearly in a very sensitive area – heart
attack patient mortality.
While the basic positive results from this study are
clear, I do not believe that there are clear norma-
tive inferences. The results show that both expen-
ditures and mortality are lower in less concentrated
markets. Kessler and McClellan claim that this im-
plies there is a welfare gain from competition. I do
not believe this is so. First, the measure of Medicare
expenditures they use is not a measure of economic
cost. Second, and more fundamentally, economic the-
ory does not predict that quality competition in price
regulated markets will lead to socially optimal quality
levels. If price is above marginal cost at the optimal
quality then competition can lead to excessive qual-
ity. Consumer welfare may be enhanced, but can be
outweighed by reduced producer welfare. In essence,
the beneﬁts that accrue to consumers from increased
quality can be smaller than the costs incurred. There-
fore, the ﬁnding that quality is higher in less concen-
trated markets tells us that consumers are likely bet-
ter oﬀ, but does not tell us if social welfare has been
improved. This is a question which an SCP analysis
is not designed to answer. Quality in unconcentrated
markets could be too high, too low, or just right. The
model that Kessler and McClellan employ ably iden-
tiﬁes the relation between concentration and quality,
but does not allow for the evaluation of welfare ef-
fects.
As I stated when discussing performance stan-
dards, we want to devote resources to reducing pa-
tient mortality up until the point where the marginal
beneﬁt of reduced mortality is balanced by the mar-
ginal cost. This means that there will be a socially
optimal mortality rate that will certainly be greater
than zero, and it is possible to devote too many re-
sources to reducing mortality. While reduced mortal-
ity is a good thing, it is not without cost, therefore
we cannot conclude that social welfare is improved
simply based on evidence that competition leads to
reduced mortality.
Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) estimate the
eﬀects of hospital market concentration on risk-
adjusted mortality rates for AMI and pneumonia, for
both Medicare and HMO patients. I will discuss their
ﬁndings with regard to Medicare patients here, since
the price is regulated for them, and discuss the ﬁnd-
ings with respect to HMO patients in the next sec-
tion. Gowrisankaran and Town use data from Los
16Angeles county from 1991-1993 for AMI and 1989-
1992 for pneumonia. Their approach is similar to that
of Kessler and McClellan. They use an SCP frame-
work, instrumenting for the HHI with hospital mar-
ket shares predicted from a patient choice equation,
where distance is the main determinant of hospital
choice. An innovation is that they construct separate,
hospital-speciﬁc, HHIs based on (predicted) hospital
market shares for Medicare, HMO, Medicaid, indi-
gent and self-pay patients, and indemnity patients.
Gowrisankaran and Town ﬁnd, in contrast to
Kessler and McClellan, that mortality is worse
for Medicare patients treated in hospitals with
lower Medicare HHIs. The implication is that
competition reduces quality for Medicare patients.
Gowrisankaran and Town hypothesize that Medicare
margins are small or negative, or that hospitals may
deviate from proﬁt-maximizing behavior. If Medicare
margins are indeed negative (i.e., p < MC), then the
results are consistent with theory. It seems unlikely,
however, that this is true for AMI. Heart treatments
for Medicare patients are widely thought to be prof-
itable. Indeed, there is substantial entry of hospitals
specializing only in the treatment of heart disease.
Since Medicare patients are a substantial portion of
heart patients, it seems as if Medicare margins must
be signiﬁcant in order to generate the observed entry.
Small or negative Medicare margins for pneumonia,
however, do seem plausible. We do not observe the
entry of hospitals specializing in pneumonia, or pul-
monary disorders generally.
This study also omits Medicare price. Since
Gowrisankaran and Town only examine Los Angeles
county there may be little or no variation in Medicare
price across hospitals for a given year. Although there
should be temporal variation, they have only a short
time period. As a consequence, there may not be
enough variation in their sample to estimate a para-
meter for Medicare price. It includes some hospital
characteristics, although it is unclear if these charac-
teristics are considered demand or cost shifters.
It is hard to know why the results of this study con-
trast so markedly with the previous one. It may be
that the Medicare price is below marginal cost (on av-
erage) for the hospitals in Gowrisankaran and Town’s
study, while the opposite is true for the hospitals in
Kessler and McClellan’s study. Since neither study
included Medicare price it is impossible to evaluate
this hypothesis. It is also possible that the estimated
relationship between the HHI and mortality is sensi-
tive to the choice of instruments. Gowrisankaran and
Town and Kessler and McClellan use similar, but not
identical, instrumenting strategies. Obviously identi-
ﬁcation is driven by the instruments, so it is possible
that the diﬀerences in instruments are driving the
diﬀerences between the studies. This is only specu-
lation, however. The opposite results from the two
studies suggest caution in drawing strong conclusions
about the impact of market structure on hospital
mortality at this point.
Kessler and Geppert (2005) extend the framework
employed by Kessler and McClellan to consider the
impact of concentration on diﬀerences in quality be-
tween patients. Their work is inspired by the theoret-
ical result that oligopolists will ﬁnd it optimal to en-
gage in product diﬀerentiation in order to relax price
competition (see Tirole, 1988, section 7.5.1). These
theory papers are not directly relevant for Kessler and
Geppert’s empirical exercise, since the theory exam-
ines quality dispersion when ﬁrms set prices. Kessler
and Geppert examine Medicare patients, for whom
price is set via regulation. Clearly any incentive to
engage in product diﬀerentation is not related to a de-
sire to relax price competition for Medicare patients.
It is possible that hospitals may be attempting to
relax price competition for private patients, and are
unable to quality discriminate between Medicare and
private patients, perhaps for legal or ethical reasons.
It seems like it should be a straightforward result
from models where ﬁrms choose both product vari-
ety and product quality that oligopolists operating in
a market with a regulated price have an incentive to
diﬀerentiate themselves with regard to product vari-
ety in order to avoid the kind of quality competition
described previously in Section 3.3.31
31If one takes the kind of model used in Lyon (1999) or
Kamien and Vincent (1991), where ﬁrms locate on a line, it
seems evident that ﬁrms will have an incentive to locate as
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sions, mortality) and expense (expenditures, various
measures of utilization) for Medicare heart attack pa-
tients, as in Kessler and McClellan. They contrast
outcomes and expenditures for high-risk and low-risk
patients in highly concentrated vs. unconcentrated
markets. High-risk patients are those who were hos-
pitalized with a heart attack in the previous year,
whereas low-risk patients had no such hospitaliza-
tion. They ﬁnd that low-risk patients receive more
intensive treatment in highly concentrated markets,
but have no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in out-
comes. High-risk patients, on the other hand, receive
less intensive treatment in highly concentrated mar-
kets, and have signiﬁcantly worse outcomes. They
conclude that competition leads to increased varia-
tion in patient expenditures, and that it is welfare
enhancing, since on net outcomes are better and ex-
penditures are lower. Medicare price is omitted, as
in previous studies.
This paper adds to the evidence that concentra-
tion is signiﬁcantly correlated with readily observ-
able measures of quality for hospitals. As I stated
previously in discussing Kessler and McClellan, I do
not believe that there are clear welfare implications.
The statistical relationship between quality disper-
sion and concentration is surprising and interesting.
So far as I know, this is the only paper to examine
quality dispersion. What economic behavior gener-
ated these patterns in the data is an intriguing puz-
zle.
Mukamel et al. (2001) examine risk-adjusted hospi-
tal mortality for Medicare patients in 134 Metropol-
itan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in 1990. They focus
on the impact of HMOs, but also examine hospital
market concentration. Mukamel et al. (2001) ﬁnd
far apart from each other as possible (at the ends of the line),
rather than nearby (in the middle). If they locate in the mid-
dle, the ﬁrms are identical, so the one that produces the highest
product quality will take the entire market. Thus ﬁrms will en-
gage in ﬁerce product quality competition, up until the point
that proﬁts are dissipated. If ﬁrms are located at the ends of
the line, then each ﬁrm will be considerably more attractive to
consumers located very close to it. This will dampen quality
competition.
that HMO penetration (the percent of the MSA pop-
ulation enrolled in an HMO) has a negative impact
on excess hospital mortality (the diﬀerence between
observed mortality and predicted risk-adjusted mor-
tality), i.e., HMO penetration is associated with bet-
ter quality. Hospital market concentration (measured
by the HHI) has no statistically signiﬁcant impact
on mortality. HMO market concentration is also in-
cluded as an explanatory variable, although it is not
signiﬁcant. Medicare price is omitted. It is unclear
what to make of these results. First, Mukamel et al.’s
speciﬁcation includes inpatient expenditures, which
are certainly endogenous, as well as hospital HHI,
HMO HHI, and HMO penetration, which may very
well be endogenous, so it is unclear that the resulting
estimates are consistent. It is possible that hospital
concentration does truly have an impact on mortal-
ity, but that it is not consistently estimated in this
study. Second, it is not clear how enrollment in pri-
vate HMO plans aﬀects the mortality of Medicare
patients. Presumably there has to be some spillover
eﬀect, but the nature of the mechanism is unclear, as
Mukamel et al. acknowledge.
A recent study that does take account of Medicare
price eﬀects is Shen (2003). Shen examines the
impact of ﬁnancial pressure from reduced Medicare
payments and HMO penetration on mortality from
AMI, controlling for the hospital’s competitive envi-
ronment.32 She examines data from 1985-1990 and
1990-1994 for most nonrural hospitals in the U.S.
Shen’s measure of market structure is an indicator for
whether there are ﬁve or more other hospitals within
a 15 mile radius of a hospital. This is interacted with
a measure of the change in the Medicare price and
the change in HMO penetration. There are direct
eﬀects of Medicare price and HMO penetration, but
not market structure.
Shen ﬁnds a negative and signiﬁcant relationship
between the change in Medicare price and mortal-
ity. The interaction between the market structure
32There have been a number of studies assessing the impact
of the change in Medicare hospital payment from cost-plus to
ﬁxed price (the Medicare Prospective Payment system). See,
for example, Kahn et al. (1990); Cutler (1995).
18and Medicare price variable is negative and signiﬁ-
cant for 1990-1994, but has no signiﬁcant impact on
mortality for 1985-1990. These results are consistent
with standard theory. Hospitals respond to an in-
crease in the regulated price by increasing quality.
This response is ampliﬁed when hospitals face more
competitors.
The eﬀects of HMO penetration also appear to be
roughly consistent with theory. Shen ﬁnds that HMO
penetration leads to higher mortality, and that hos-
pitals in markets with more competitors appeared to
respond to HMO penetration with quality reductions
in 1985-1990, although not thereafter. HMOs are hy-
pothesized to increase the price elasticity of demand
facing hospitals. If so, then the increased price elas-
ticity will likely lead to a quality reduction. This
should be ampliﬁed in markets with more competi-
tors, since that should also increase the price elas-
ticity. Shen also does a simple normative analysis of
the eﬀects of ﬁnancial pressure, but not the eﬀects of
competition.
A paper by Tay (2003) takes a more structural
approach. Tay speciﬁes and estimates a structural
econometric model of hospital choice by Medicare en-
rollees with AMI.33 Tay uses data on urban enrollees
in conventional Medicare, located in California, Ore-
gon, and Washington in 1994. She examines the ef-
fect of a number of aspects of quality and distance on
the probability a patient is admitted to a particular
hospital. The quality measures include two clinical
outcomes: the mortality rate and the complication
rate; a measure of input intensity: nurses per bed;
and whether the hospital can perform two high-tech
cardiac services: catheterization or revascularization.
All measures of quality are treated as exogenous.
33A number of papers have previously examined whether
choice of hospital is aﬀected by quality (Luft et al., 1990; Burns
and Wholey, 1992; Chernew et al., 1998). These studies ﬁnd
that clinical quality, as measured by deviation between ex-
pected and actual mortality rates, has a signiﬁcant impact on
hospital choice – hospitals with lower mortality are more likely
to be chosen. The responsiveness found in these studies indi-
cates the potential for quality competition among hospitals,
although how much is not clear, since the studies were not
designed to assess this.
Tay ﬁnds that hospital demand is negatively af-
fected by patient distance and positively aﬀected by
quality. She then simulates the eﬀects of changes in
the various aspects of a hospital’s quality, holding the
total number of heart attack patients ﬁxed, the loca-
tions of patients and hospitals ﬁxed, and the qualities
of all other hospitals ﬁxed. Adopting a catheteriza-
tion lab is predicted to increase demand by 65 per-
cent, while adding revascularization in addition to
catheterization increases demand by 76 percent. If
the number of nurses per bed is increased by one
percent, then demand is predicted to increase by 24
percent.
Tay shows that hospital demand is signiﬁcantly af-
fected by quality and distance, thus there are po-
tentially high payoﬀs to hospitals increasing quality.
While this represents an advance over the previous
literature by using more detailed modelling, there are
nonetheless some limitations to the inferences that
can be drawn from this study.
As with the previous studies, the Medicare price is
omitted. It is possible that this omission is inconse-
quential, but I see no way to tell. Tay assumes that
hospitals set the same level of quality for Medicare
and non-Medicare patients. This is also an untested
assumption, although it is at least explicit.
More fundamentally, the supply side of the market
is not modelled. As a consequence, competition itself
is not modelled and can not be examined explicitly.
There is no structure in place for dealing with the
potential endogeneity of the quality variables. There
is the usual reason to be concerned about endogene-
ity, since quality is chosen by the ﬁrm. In addition,
it has been observed for a number of hospital proce-
dures that hospital volume causes patient outcomes
(see section 4.2.3 below for a review of some stud-
ies). This suggests endogeneity of the mortality and
complication rates.
Further, the simulation is an out of equilibrium
prediction. Tay’s predicted eﬀects of adding a
catheterization lab or other services on demand are
likely too large, since they hold rivals’ responses ﬁxed.
If rivals respond by also adopting catherization labs
or other services, then the equilibrium eﬀects should
19be smaller, potentially even zero. It is also unclear
whether ﬁrms would actually make the predicted
choices. If rivals respond strongly to a ﬁrm’s adop-
tion of services, the responses may make adoption un-
proﬁtable. As a consequence it is hard to assess the
magnitude of quality eﬀects. Last, as Tay acknowl-
edges, without a supply side no welfare analysis can
be performed.
Most of these studies are quite recent. There are,
however, two early studies that should be mentioned.
Shortell and Hughes (1988) examine the association
between in-hospital mortality among Medicare pa-
tients in 1983 and concentration. They ﬁnd no sta-
tistically signiﬁcant association, and the point esti-
mate of the impact of concentration on mortality is
small. Shortell and Hughes also examine the impact
of stringency of state hospital price regulation pro-
grams and state regulation of hospital entry. They
ﬁnd that mortality was signiﬁcantly worse in states
with stringent price regulation and strict entry re-
strictions. This is exactly as the theory predicts – if
the regulated price is lower, quality will be lower as
well. Entry restriction will lead to lower quality.
Held and Pauly (1983) examines the competition
and quality in the dialysis market. All people with
end stage renal disease (ESRD, i.e., kidney failure) in
the U.S. are covered by Medicare. Medicare pays a
ﬁxed price to dialysis facilities for treating patients.
They use data on dialysis facilities in large urban ar-
eas of the U.S. in 1977 and 1978. The measure of
quality is dialysis machines per patient. The notion
is that greater capacity translates into greater conve-
nience for patients in scheduling appointments. They
regress the HHI for dialysis facilities on the number of
dialysis machines per patient, including a number of
control variables. The Medicare price is omitted, be-
cause there is no variation in the price in the sample.
Held and Pauly ﬁnd that there are more dialysis ma-
chines per patient in less concentrated areas. Hence,
competition increases quality. Held and Pauly recog-
nize that they are unable to draw normative conclu-
sions from their analysis.
4.2 Studies with Prices Set by Firms
I now turn my attention to econometric studies of
competition and quality where prices are set by ﬁrms.
I will subdivide these studies into three categories.
The ﬁrst consists of older studies of the “Medical
Arms Race.” The second are newer studies that ex-
amine the impact of competition on hospital qual-
ity either via the SCP model or examining the im-
pacts of mergers or price deregulation. The results
are summarized in Table 4. The last category are
papers studying the relationship of hospital volume
of speciﬁc procedures to patients’ clinical outcomes.
The results of these studies are summarized in Ta-
ble 5. In both tables the entry in the column labelled
“Eﬀect of Competition on Quality” indicates the di-
rection of the relationship between the competition
measure and the quality measure. The measure of
quality used in the study is listed under the column
heading “Quality Measure,” and the measure of com-
petition is listed in the column labeled “Competition
Measure.” For example, in the ﬁrst row, the study
by Joskow ﬁnds that his quality measure, excess bed
capacity, is lower in more competitive markets, as
indicated by the HHI.
4.2.1 Older Studies — “Medical Arms Race”
There are a number of studies of what has been
dubbed “The Medical Arms Race.” These studies ex-
amine the impact of competition on a number of mea-
sures of quality, usually facilities rather than clinical
quality. They cover the period in the 1970s and 1980s
when it was generally agreed that price competition
among hospitals was weak or nonexistent. The no-
tion was that, since price competition was weak, then
competition must occur over non-price attributes.34
If we accept that price competition during this period
is essentially nonexistent, then these studies should
be regarded as similar to studies of competition with
regulated prices, in contrast to the more recent stud-
ies I discuss below, which occur during a period in
34See Lyon (1999) for a model that generates this in equi-
librium.
20which there is clearly vigorous price competition.
This literature typically regresses a measure of
market concentration (often the HHI) on some mea-
sure of input use or costs. The medical arms race
is to be detected via a negative correlation between
concentration and the input measure. Evidence of
a negative relationship is generally presumed to be
evidence of welfare reducing non-price competition.
Examples of this literature are Joskow (1980);
Robinson and Luft (1985); Dranove et al. (1992).
Joskow examines the relationship between hospital
reserve capacity (i.e., unoccupied beds) and the HHI
for all U.S. hospitals in 1976. Joskow takes reserve ca-
pacity as quality. He ﬁnds that hospitals in less con-
centrated markets had more excess capacity. Based
on the model of quality competition with regulated
prices presented in Section 3.3, Joskow deduces that
competition may lead to supra-optimal excess capac-
ity in hospital markets. This may be correct, but
unlike the model, prices are not ﬁxed. Without a
fuller examination of price determination in hospi-
tal markets at that time, or of the costs associated
with excess capacity, it isn’t possible to make a de-
termination about the welfare impacts of non-price
competition.
Robinson and Luft (1985) study the impact of mar-
ket structure on inpatient admissions, outpatient vis-
its, length of stay and average costs for California
hospitals in 1972. They use indicators of the number
of other hospitals within a 15 mile radius of a hospi-
tal as measures of market structure, and regress those
on their outcome variables. Robinson and Luft ﬁnd
that hospitals with more neighbors within 15 miles
have more inpatient admissions and higher costs per
case and per day, although there is no impact on
outpatient visits or length of stay. Quality is un-
observed. Presumably hospitals with more neighbors
face tougher competition and are supplying higher
quality, leading to the estimated positive relations be-
tween number of neighbors and admissions and costs.
They infer that hospital competition is welfare reduc-
ing. Although the correlations this study turned up
are interesting, it is not clear how to interpret them,
either positively or normatively. The relationships
they estimate are not derived from any obvious eco-
nomic model, which makes interpretation diﬃcult.
Dranove et al. (1992) examine hospital adoption of
sophisticated medical technologies. They utilize 1983
hospital data from California, and examine the im-
pact of the HHI and market size on the number of
hospitals in the market adopting particular technolo-
gies. Dranove et al. ﬁnd that the HHI has a negative
impact on the number of hospitals adopting these
technologies, i.e., there is more adoption in less con-
centrated markets. They also ﬁnd, however, a very
strong eﬀect of market size on adoption. They inter-
pret their results as providing evidence that market
size is more important than market concentration, al-
though the results do provide at least weak support
for the medical arms race hypothesis.
Noether (1988) uses a slightly diﬀerent method-
ology. She uses data on prices and expenses for 11
frequent diagnoses in all U.S. hospitals located in SM-
SAs from 1977 and 1978. She ﬁnds that less concen-
trated markets have lower prices and higher expenses,
although the eﬀect is weak and small. Thus this pa-
per provides some moderate support for the existence
of both price and non-price competition among hos-
pitals in the 1970s.
4.2.2 Recent Studies
There have been a number of more recent stud-
ies of competition and quality in hospital markets.
These all cover time periods from the 1990s or later,
when it is generally agreed that price competition
had emerged in hospital markets. I will ﬁrst discuss
SCP studies, then cover merger studies, then ﬁnally
move to studies of price deregulation. In consider-
ing these studies we need to refer back to the theory
for guidance. Unlike the case of regulated prices, eco-
nomic theory on competition and quality is less clear.
Nonetheless, theory does provide a guide to what to
look for, and what economic factors might be under-
lying an estimated relationship.
The study by Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) ex-
amined the relationship between market structure
21and AMI and pneumonia mortality in Los Angeles
county in the early 1990s for both Medicare and HMO
patients. I discussed the ﬁndings for Medicare pa-
tients in the previous section. I now turn to HMO
patients. Gowrisankaran and Town ﬁnd that risk-
adjusted mortality is signiﬁcantly lower in less con-
centrated parts of Los Angeles county. This implies
that competition is quality increasing for HMO pa-
tients. Using equation (18) for guidance, we see that
this could occur if the quality elasticity of demand
is higher in less concentrated markets, or if the price
elasticity is lower. Since we generally think that elas-
ticities are higher with more competitors, the former
seems plausible (and the latter does not).
Sohn and Rathouz (2003) study the impact of com-
petition on risk-adjusted mortality for patients re-
ceiving percutaneous transluminal coronary angio-
plasty (PTCA) in 116 hospitals in California in
1995. They construct a “competition coeﬃcient”
that varies between zero and one depending on the
degree of overlap in the patient pools of a pair of
hospitals. Sohn and Rathouz ﬁnd that mortality is
lower for patients in hospitals facing more competi-
tion. This eﬀect is stronger in lower volume hospitals.
Again, this result seems to imply that the quality
elasticity is higher in more competitive markets.
Mukamel et al. (2002) examine the impact of com-
petition on risk-adjusted mortality for California pa-
tients in 1982 and 1989. The two years cover the pe-
riod before and after the introduction of insurer selec-
tive contracting in California. They hypothesize that
the introduction of selective contracting increased
price competition and that hospitals responded by
shifting resources from clinical activities, which are
hard to observe, to hotel activities, which are more
easily observed. Mukamel et al. estimate the eﬀects
of the level of hospital concentration (measured as
the HHI) in the base year and the change in hos-
pital concentration on the change in inpatient clini-
cal expenditures, and then the impact of the change
in expenditures and the level of the hospital HHI in
1989 on the level of risk-adjusted mortality in 1989.
They ﬁnd that the change in the HHI had a nega-
tive and signiﬁcant impact on both clinical and hotel
expenditures for not-for-proﬁt hospitals, but no sig-
niﬁcant impact on for-proﬁt hospitals. The estimated
relationship between clinical expenditures and mor-
tality is negative. Mukamel et al. ﬁnd that together
these two results imply that increased competition
from 1982-1989 led to increased mortality, operat-
ing via competition reducing clinical expenditures on
patients. The introduction of selective contracting
is likely to have increased the price elasticity of de-
mand facing hospitals, without increasing the qual-
ity elasticity by a similar proportion. In this case,
the Dorfman and Steiner model predicts that quality
will fall.
Encinosa and Bernard (2005) use data on all in-
patient discharges from Florida hospitals from 1996
to 2000 to examine the impacts of ﬁnancial pressure
on patient safety. Encinosa and Bernard employ a
newly available set of quality indicators developed
by the Agency for Health Care Research and Qual-
ity (AHRQ). These indicators measure a variety of
factors reﬂecting clinical quality, including mortality,
obstetric complications, adverse or iatrogenic com-
plications, wound infections, surgery complications,
caesarean section, and inappropriate surgery.35 En-
cinosa and Bernard estimate the impact of within
hospital changes in lagged operating proﬁt margins36
on the probabilities of adverse patient safety events.
They ﬁnd that patients at hospitals in the low-
est quartile of operating proﬁt margins have signif-
icantly higher probabilities of adverse safety events
than those in any of the higher quartiles. There
are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the probability of ad-
verse events between patients in the highest, second-
highest, or third-highest quartiles.37 Thus patients
at hospitals that are doing poorly ﬁnancially are at
greater risk of suﬀering from a patient safety problem
than those who are at hospitals that are doing bet-
35Go to http://http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov
for more information.
36The ratio of net operating proﬁt to net operating revenue.
37The ﬁrst quartile covers patients at hospitals with margins
below -0.5%. The second quartile covers margins between -
0.5% and 4.4%, the third between 4.4% and 9.3%, and the
fourth covers margins greater than 9.3%.
22ter ﬁnancially. There seems to be no impact of doing
better ﬁnancially above a threshold (bottom quartile
of operating margin).
This ﬁnding is roughly consistent with theory. We
expect that quality will be positively related to mar-
ginal proﬁts, so the empirical ﬁnding that quality is
lower at hospitals with low proﬁts seems likely. Stan-
dard theory would predict a continuous eﬀect of prof-
its on quality, however, not a threshold. It is possible
that this could be due to data limitations. Encinosa
and Bernard have to rely on accounting data, so they
are unable to measure economic proﬁts or construct
a measure of marginal proﬁts.
There are also some issues with the econometrics.
Encinosa and Bernard use hospital dummies to con-
trol for hospital-speciﬁc unobserved factors. The es-
timating equations are logits for the probabilities of
adverse patient safety events. This is a nonlinear es-
timator, so unlike least squares, hospital-speciﬁc ef-
fects are not diﬀerenced away. As a consequence, it
isn’t clear to what extent their estimates of the ef-
fects of proﬁts on safety are truly purged of poten-
tially confounding hospital-speciﬁc eﬀects. Another
issue is that slope estimates from nonlinear models
with group ﬁxed eﬀects are only consistent when the
number of observations per group goes to inﬁnity. In
this context, that means that the number of years
each hospital is observed has to be large. Since the
sample in this paper covers 5 years, it seems unlikely
this condition is met, hence the estimates may not be
consistent.
While this study does not directly examine com-
petition, it may have implications for the impact of
competition on quality. To the extent that competi-
tion reduces hospital operating margins to low levels
as in Encinosa and Bernard it may put patients at
higher risk of adverse safety events.
Propper et al. (2004) use an SCP approach to ex-
amine the eﬀect of the eﬀect of hospital competition
in the United Kingdom following reforms to the Na-
tional Health Service in the 1990s. These reforms en-
couraged payer-driven competition among hospitals.
Propper et al. examine the impact of this payer-
driven competition on mortality for AMI patients.
They examine the impact of a measure of market
structure (roughly, the number of competitors) on
mortality over the period 1995-1998 and ﬁnd that
mortality increases with the number of competitors.
This ﬁnding certainly contrasts with that of U.S. SCP
studies, but (for better or for worse) it is consistent
with theory. The presence of more competitors can
increase quality elasticity, price elasticity, or both. If
the price elasticity increases more than the quality
elasticity, then quality will fall. Whether this is the
mechanism driving the result in this paper can not be
determined, although it provides some direction for
future research. As previously, the welfare impacts
of this ﬁnding are unclear. If increasing the number
of competitors is associated with a decrease in mar-
ket power, then a quality decrease may be welfare
improving. Alternatively, it could be harmful.
An interesting study is by Sari (2002). Sari uses
the same quality indicators as Encinosa and Bernard.
Sari is one of the ﬁrst studies to employ these indi-
cators rather than following the common practice of
using risk-adjusted mortality as a quality measure.
He employs data on hospitals in 16 states covering
the period 1992-1997 and estimates the SCP model
using ﬁxed eﬀects, random eﬀects, and instrumental
variables with ﬁxed eﬀects. Sari ﬁnds that quality
is signiﬁcantly lower in more concentrated markets
– he estimates that a 10 percent increase in hospi-
tal market share leads to a 0.18 percent decrease in
quality. He also ﬁnds evidence that managed care
penetration increases quality for some of the quality
indicators, although there is no statistically signiﬁ-
cant relationship for others.
Ho and Hamilton (2000) and Capps (2005) are two
papers that examine the impact of hospital mergers
on quality of care. Ho and Hamilton (2000) study
130 hospital mergers of various types over the pe-
riod 1992 to 1995. The quality measures they em-
ploy are inpatient mortality, readmission rates, and
early discharge of newborns. They employ hospital
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects to control for time invariant hos-
pital characteristics that may be related to merger.
Ho and Hamilton ﬁnd no detectable impact of merger
on mortality for either heart attack or stroke patients.
They do ﬁnd that some mergers increase readmission
23rates for heart attack patients and the early discharge
of newborns. It is unclear whether Ho and Hamilton
ﬁnd no eﬀect because there truly is no eﬀect or be-
cause they are unable to identify the eﬀect in the
data. The eﬀects of mergers are notoriously diﬃ-
cult to identify. First, there are not a large number
of mergers, so there is not a lot of statistical power
with which to detect an eﬀect. Second, the identify-
ing variation in this study comes from within-hospital
variation over time. If that is not the primary source
of variation in outcomes then the estimates of the pa-
rameters will be imprecise. Third, mergers are cer-
tainly endogenous. Mergers occur for reasons that
are often related to the outcome variables of inter-
est. If mergers occur for reasons related to hospitals’
changing circumstances over time, then the hospital
ﬁxed eﬀects will not control for endogeneity, so it will
be diﬃcult to obtain consistent estimates of a merger
eﬀect.
Capps (2005) uses the AHRQ quality indicators
to examine the eﬀect of hospital mergers on qual-
ity. He compares merging to non-merging hospitals
in New York state during 1995-2000. There are 25
merging hospitals, and 246 total. Control groups are
constructed in 2 ways. The ﬁrst method is to se-
lect non-merging hospitals that are similar to merging
hospitals in observable characteristics (e.g., teaching
status, size, ownership, etc.). The second method is
to use propensity scores to identify a control group.
The control group for a merging hospital then con-
sists of the ten non-merging hospitals that have pre-
dicted probabilities of merging that are closest to the
predicted probability of the merging hospital.
Using the ﬁrst method Capps ﬁnds no statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect of mergers on most of the quality
indicators. There is no eﬀect on 4 of 6 inpatient indi-
cators for quality procedures, no eﬀect for indicators
for 3 other surgical procedures, and no eﬀect for 6 pa-
tient safety indicators. Merger is found to have a neg-
ative eﬀect on the inpatient quality indicators for 2
cardiac procedures: AMI and congestive heart failure
(CHF). Merger is estimated to lead to an additional
12 deaths per 1,000 AMI or CHF admissions in the
year following the merger, although there is no signif-
icant eﬀect in the second year after the merger. There
are no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of merger on any
of the quality indicators when propensity scores are
used to generate a control group. As with the Ho and
Hamilton paper it is hard to know how to interpret
the overall lack of statistical signiﬁcance. Mergers
may truly have had no impact on hospital quality in
New York state over this period, or it may just be
very diﬃcult to precisely test the hypothesis.
Two very interesting recent papers use changes in
regulation as a way to learn about the eﬀect of hospi-
tal competition on quality. Volpp et al. (2003) study
the eﬀect of the deregulation of hospital prices in New
Jersey to try and learn about the impact of the in-
troduction of price competition on hospital quality.
In 1992 New Jersey deregulated hospital prices. The
neighboring state of New York had no change in its
hospital regulatory regime. Volpp et al. use data
on AMI hospital admissions in New Jersey and New
York from 1990 to 1996 to learn about the eﬀect of
the deregulation. They look at the diﬀerence in risk-
adjusted inpatient AMI mortality between New Jer-
sey and New York before and after regulatory repeal.
They ﬁnd that mortality in New Jersey relative to
New York increased after price deregulation. At ﬁrst
glance this result contrasts markedly with the SCP
type studies previously discussed. However, consider
the impact of price deregulation. The biggest impact
should be to increase the price elasticity of demand,
and decrease price.38 The quality elasticity seems un-
likely to be signiﬁcantly aﬀected. The prediction of
the Dorfman and Steiner type model is that quality
will fall when the price elasticity of demand increases.
It is impossible to say what the impact on welfare
might be. If the regulated prices were set too high,
then this quality decrease is welfare increasing, and
vice versa.
A paper by Propper et al. (2003) employs a similar
approach to Volpp et al. In this paper Propper et al.
(2003) examine the impacts of competitive reforms
in the NHS on mortality for AMI patients. Propper
et al. (2003) use a diﬀerent strategy in this paper than
38Unfortunately Volpp et al. do not have any evidence on
the eﬀect of deregulation on prices.
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in regulation in the U.K. over the period 1991-1999,
combined with geographic variation in the number of
competitors.39 Competition was introduced in 1991
and actively promoted up until 1995. It was down-
played after 1995 and actively discouraged from 1997
onwards. The impact of competition is identiﬁed by
diﬀerences between hospitals facing competitors and
those who are not between the time periods when
competition was encouraged versus when it was dis-
couraged.
Propper et al. (2003) ﬁnd that competition reduces
quality. The diﬀerences in mortality for hospitals in
areas with competitors versus those with no competi-
tors was higher during the period when competition
was promoted (1991-1995), than during the period
when competition was discouraged (1996-1998). The
estimated cumulative eﬀect of competition over the
entire period is to raise mortality rates by roughly the
same amount as the cumulative eﬀect of the secular
downward trend in heart attack mortality (presum-
ably due to technological change). This is a large im-
pact. As with Volpp et al. (2003), these results can
be interpreted as consistent with the Dorfman and
Steiner model, although that is not testable within
the framework employed in the paper. Also as be-
fore, the welfare inferences are unclear.
Howard (2005) is a recent paper that focuses on
demand, as in the paper by Tay. Howard models the
demand for kidney transplantation facilities, focusing
on the eﬀect of quality on consumer choice of facility.
Howard examines the choices of all patients receiv-
ing transplants, including Medicare patients, Medic-
aid patients, and those with private insurance.
Quality is measured as the diﬀerence between ex-
pected and actual one year post-transplant graft fail-
ure rates at a center. Howard assumes that there are
no price diﬀerences that aﬀect choice between trans-
plant centers, thus price is omitted. The explanatory
variables are the quality measure, patients’ distances
from transplant centers, and patient characteristics.
39Only variation in the number of competitors is used in
Propper et al. (2004).
The average estimated choice elasticity with respect
to quality is -0.12. The quality elasticity for privately
insured patients is larger: -0.22.
These elasticity estimates are not particularly
large. The low value of the average estimated quality
elasticity implies that this does not give transplant
centers a large incentive to compete on quality, as
indicated by equation (29). Since Howard does not
model the supply side, his model doesn’t directly pre-
dict the impacts of competition (it is not intended to
do so).
As with the Tay paper there are also some con-
cerns about price and endogeneity. Howard assumes
that price has no impact on where patients obtain
their transplants. This may be true for Medicare,
but it seems unlikely for patients who are privately
insured. Privately insured patients face very large
diﬀerences in out of pocket costs between providers
that are in and out of their coverage networks. In
addition, health insurance plans make decisions on
which providers to include in their networks based
on price. Thus it seems as if price should be included
for those with private insurance. Further, if price is
positively correlated with quality, then its omission
could lead to a downward bias in the estimated eﬀect
of quality on demand. Patients may appear less re-
sponsive to quality diﬀerences than they really are if
high quality transplant centers are also high cost to
them. Endogeneity of quality may also be an issue,
for the same reasons as the Tay paper.
Abraham et al. (2005) is one of the few studies
with clear welfare implications. Abraham et al. ex-
amine the determinants of the number of hospitals
in isolated markets in the U.S. for 1990. They do
not examine price or quality explicitly. Instead, they
infer whether competition is increasing by the popu-
lation required to support another ﬁrm in the market.
If the population required to support another ﬁrm is
increasing, then average proﬁts available post-entry
must be decreasing, thus increasing the volume nec-
essary to make entry proﬁtable. They ﬁnd that mar-
ket size is the primary determinant of the number
of hospitals, and that the quantity bought and sold
in the market rises, and variable proﬁts fall, as the
25number of hospitals in a local market increases. This
implies that the market is getting more competitive
as the number of hospitals increase. Further, it shows
that entry isn’t simply demand-stealing — more hos-
pitals increase demand. The reason is that quantity
demanded can increase only if price is lower or qual-
ity is higher. Since that does happen, people are
consuming more and must be better oﬀ. As a con-
sequence, they conclude that competition increases
with the number of hospitals, and that competition
is welfare improving.
4.2.3 Studies of the Volume-Outcome Rela-
tionship
There have been a very large number of studies of
the “volume-outcome” relationship, the majority in
the medical literature. These studies commonly ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant correlation with the volume a hospital
does of a procedure and the medical outcomes of pa-
tients receiving the procedure at that hospital. The
obvious concern with studies of this kind is endogene-
ity. It may be that hospitals that do more of a proce-
dure are better at it, whether from learning by doing
or by making quality improving investments. It may
also be true, however, that patients are attracted to
hospitals with the best outcomes. The studies in the
medical literature are unable to distinguish between
these two alternatives.
This is important for assessing competition in the
hospital sector and for antitrust enforcement. If vol-
ume causes quality, then there may be some eﬃcien-
cies from improved patient outcomes in more concen-
trated markets. This could also aﬀect hospital merger
evaluation. I review three relatively recent studies be-
low that present the strongest evidence to date on the
volume-outcome eﬀect: Ho (2002), Gowrisankaran
et al. (2004), and Gaynor et al. (2005). The results
of these studies are summarized in Table 5.
Ho (2002) examines the volume outcome relation-
ship for PTCA using data from California hospitals
from 1984 to 1996. The outcomes she examines are
mortality and emergency CABG. She estimates the
eﬀects of hospital cumulative and annual volume on
outcomes, employing hospital and time ﬁxed eﬀects.
Ho ﬁnds substantial improvements in outcomes over
time, but a small eﬀect of annual hospital volume on
outcome. The eﬀect of cumulative volume on out-
comes is imprecisely estimated.
Gowrisankaran et al. (2004) attempt to recover the
causal relationship between volume and outcome us-
ing instrumental variables. They study the volume-
outcome relationship for three surgical procedures:
the Whipple procedure (removing tumors from the
pancreas); CABG; and repair of abdominal aortic
aneurysm (AAA - this repairs weak spots in the ab-
dominal artery). They use data on hospitals from
Florida from 1988 to 1999 and California from 1993
to 1997. The instrumental variables approach is to
use patient distance from the hospital to estimate
patient choice of hospital and then construct pre-
dicted volume. Gowrisankaran et al. ﬁnd that in-
creasing volume causes better outcomes for all three
procedures and ﬁnd signiﬁcant and large eﬀects of
hospital volume on patient mortality. This implies
that volume-outcome eﬀects can be important to con-
sider when evaluating the impact of hospital compe-
tition. If competition leads to reduced volume then
outcomes will decline. If competition leads to spe-
cialization then outcomes will improve.
Gaynor et al. (2005), in a similar paper, use in-
strumental variables techniques to estimate the vol-
ume outcome relationship for CABG. They use data
from California for 1983-1999. Gaynor et al. ﬁnd a
causal, and substantial, eﬀect of volume on outcome.
For example, if CABGs could only be performed in
hospitals with a volume of 200 or greater, the aver-
age mortality rate from CABG would fall from 2.5
percent to 2.05 percent, saving 118 (statistical) lives.
In a related working paper by the same authors, Sei-
der et al. (2000), simulate the eﬀects of two mergers:
a hypothetical ”standard merger”, in which two out
of ﬁve ﬁrms with equal market shares merge; and the
actual merger of Alta Bates Medical Center and Sum-
mit Medical Center in Oakland, California. They ﬁnd
that, for larger hospital mergers (hospital volumes
> 140), the value of saved lives from the standard
merger outweighs the loss of consumer surplus from
increased prices. For the Summit-Alta Bates merger,
26which does not, however, have a large eﬀect on vol-
ume, the eﬀect is a net loss of $2.8 to $4.4 million.
The reason is that the increase in volume due to the
merger is too small to have much eﬀect on outcomes,
while the price increase reduces welfare.
5 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper I have reviewed the literature relevant
to competition and quality in health care markets.
Economic theory does not provide an unambiguous
answer to the question of whether competition is
welfare enhancing in markets with product diﬀeren-
tiation, although it provides guidance for thinking
about the issues. The empirical literature on compe-
tition and quality in health care markets is for the
most part fairly recent, and growing rapidly. The re-
sults from empirical research are not uniform. Most
of the studies of Medicare patients show a positive
impact of competition on quality. This is not sur-
prising, since economic theory for markets with reg-
ulated prices predicts such a result. However, the
results from studies of markets where prices are set
by ﬁrms (e.g, privately insured patients) are much
more variable. Some studies show increased compe-
tition leading to increased quality, and some show the
opposite. While this may appear surprising, it is not.
Economic theory predicts that quality may either in-
crease or decrease with increased competition when
ﬁrms are setting both quality and price.
This ﬁrst generation of studies has provided a very
valuable base of knowledge for further research. The
base that has been constructed, while extremely use-
ful, does not allow for normative analysis, for the
most part. The results of these studies don’t allow
us to make inferences about whether their estimated
results imply that competition increased or decreased
social welfare.
A major next step for research in this area is sort-
ing out the factors that determine whether competi-
tion will lead to increased or decreased quality. Eco-
nomic theory can be a helpful guide for these next
generation studies. While theoretical models of price
and quality determination are complex and usually
yield indeﬁnite predictions, there is also some simple
intuition that can be gleaned from theory. Whether
competition leads to increased or decreased quality
will depend on its relative impacts on ﬁrms’ price and
quality elasticities of demand. Future research can
focus on trying to recover estimates of these key ele-
ments. Additionally, studies of price regulated mar-
kets can refer back to theory to specify econometric
models that include the regulated price and marginal
cost (or its determinants). These sorts of studies will
allow for more precise positive analysis of the impact
of competition on quality in health care.
We need more detailed models, however, in order
to perform normative analysis. Thus, an important,
although formidable task, for future work is to pursue
the estimation of more complete econometric models
of quality determination in health care markets. This
means trying to recover preferences and costs (i.e.,
demand and supply). The beneﬁt of this approach is
the ability to make clearer inferences about welfare,
since estimates of preference and cost parameters are
in hand. The drawback is that such estimates are
not easily obtained. In particular, they usually can
only be obtained at the cost of making untestable
assumptions. The quantity, and detail, of health care
data may make some of the assumptions employed in
settings with sparser data unnecessary, however.
There are three other directions for future studies
to pursue. First, measures of health care quality are
becoming more common and more sophisticated. Fu-
ture studies can begin to employ these new measures.
Second, most of the studies to date have focused on
a single measure of health care quality, and often for
a single condition. A task for future work is to try to
develop broader evidence on the impact of competi-
tion on various aspects of health care quality. Third,
the study of the impact of competition on quality
should be extended to other parts of the health care
sector — most notably physician services and health
insurance.
Market oriented health care system reforms are be-
ing considered by quite a few countries. U.S. courts
have to make decisions about antitrust issues involv-
27ing health care ﬁrms. Evidence on the impacts of
competition on quality in health care is vital to the
policy decisions these individuals must make. There
is considerable scope for future research to contribute
to policy on this issue.
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Spence (1975) Set by Firm Product Quality +,−,0 Larger/Smaller/Same
Mussa and Rosen
(1978)




Set by Firm Product Quality +,−,0 Larger/Smaller/Same
Kranton (2003) Set by Firm Product Quality − Smaller
Allard et al. (2005) Set by Firm Product Quality + Same/Smaller
Spence (1976) Set by Firm Product Variety +,−,0 Larger/Smaller/Same
Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977)
Set by Firm Product Variety +,−,0 Larger/Smaller/Same
Mankiw and
Whinston (1986)
Set by Firm Product Variety +,−,0 Larger/Smaller/Same
Douglas and Miller
(1974)
Regulated Product Quality + Larger/Smaller/Same
Vander Weide and
Zalkind (1981)
Regulated Product Quality + Larger/Smaller/Same
White (1972) Regulated Product Quality + Larger/Smaller/Same
Held and Pauly
(1983)
Regulated Product Quality + Larger/Smaller/Same
Pope (1989) Regulated Product Quality + Larger/Smaller/Same
Allen and Gertler
(1991)
Regulated Product Quality + Larger/Smaller/Same
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e
r
s
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
F
a
c
t
o
r
A
ﬀ
e
c
t
i
n
g
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
E
ﬀ
e
c
t
o
n
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
H
o
(
2
0
0
2
)
1
9
8
4
-
1
9
8
6
C
a
l
i
f
o
r
n
i
a
P
T
C
A
A
l
l
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
,
C
A
B
G
S
u
r
g
i
c
a
l
V
o
l
u
m
e
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
s
m
a
l
l
)
(
v
o
l
u
m
e
↑
→
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
↓
)
G
o
w
r
i
s
a
n
k
a
r
a
n
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
4
)
1
9
9
3
-
1
9
9
7
(
C
A
)
,
1
9
8
8
-
1
9
9
9
(
F
L
)
C
a
l
i
f
o
r
n
i
a
,
F
l
o
r
i
d
a
W
h
i
p
p
l
e
P
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
,
C
A
B
G
,
A
b
d
o
m
i
n
a
l
A
o
r
t
i
c
A
n
e
u
r
y
s
m
A
l
l
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
S
u
r
g
i
c
a
l
V
o
l
u
m
e
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
v
o
l
u
m
e
↑
→
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
↓
)
G
a
y
n
o
r
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
5
)
1
9
8
3
-
1
9
9
9
C
a
l
i
f
o
r
n
i
a
C
A
B
G
A
l
l
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
S
u
r
g
i
c
a
l
V
o
l
u
m
e
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
v
o
l
u
m
e
↑
→
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
↓
)
40